Tonight's Fresh Air, with Terry Gross, was most interesting. It was about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which started 40 years ago today — October 16, 1962.

The cuban missle crisis was one of those times when people remember, years later, exactly what they were doing. I was an 18 year old freshman at the University of Washington, in Seattle. I commuted to the U with friends, from the Eastside. We were sitting in the car of one of my friend's dad — a big 1961 Oldsmobile. It was a kind of pea soup green. The kind of car a doctor would drive. We were facing south, parked in the Montlake parking lot. It was a sunny, crisp, fall afternoon when we heard the news on the car radio. It just kind of focused you knowing that we were very close to nuclear war.

Terry Gross interviewed Arthur Schlesinger, a Special Assistant to President Kennedy, and Peter Kornbluh, from The National Security Archive. Peter Kornbluh is an editor of a book about The Cuban Missile Crisis.

You must listen to it. It's very enlightening in light of the actions of our pResident. A couple of suprises were turned up at the convention from the declassified documentation. (The convention had the Russian and American advisors involved with the crisis and Castro headed the Cuban team.) Firstly, Castro never wanted the missles. He knew they would ony draw unwanted attention. He was also convinced, from the ongoing very aggressive U.S. actions, that the U.S. was planning to invade again. (It was only one year from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.) It was also clear, from documentation and recorded conversations, that Cuba was not a Soviet client.

It was also interesting the extent Kennedy was willing to go to avoid a nuclear war. The military was ready for a preemptive invasion after a massive air bombardment. But the Air Force couldn't guarantee they would get all the missles. Kennedy went for alternatives. Terry asked interesting questions about the similarities with the present situation, with predictable answers.

Shlesinger is a historian and his comments reflected that background. He felt that it was a "gross act of delusion" for Bush, and his advisors, to think that they could predict the future actions of another coountry and it's leaders. History holds too many surprises. Kornbluh also said the Schlesinger felt that Bush "would flunk human history". McNamara was there too. His comment was that the military, and those advocating invasion, did not think through the consequences of their actions.

Check out the section on The Cuban Missile Crisis, for some documentation, at the The National Security Archive. Amazing and scary.

I will say that, as scary as that time was, today is scarier. Much scarier.

By the way, the hit song at the time was The Monster Mash.