The Whiskey Bar was closed this past week. Fortunately, the bartender is back and the commentary is flowing again. Billmon opens with this must read...

Failure Mode

Massey’s anguished answer basically slammed me upside the head -- forcing me to remember the human lives that have been damaged or destroyed by the Iraq fiasco, and the hellish mess it has made of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and the strategic advantages that Al Qaeda and its growing universe of clone organizations are likely to reap from this disaster. None of those things are even remotely amusing or enjoyable or suitable objects for partisan glee. Shrub’s misfortunes (unfortunately) are also America’s misfortunes – and even the world’s. So after sobering up a bit (I mean me, not Bush) I've spent the past few days thinking about what comes next. I mean, if the mainstream media is going to, in effect, wallow in the blogosphere’s archives, and military officials – the safely retired ones, at least – are going to confess what’s been obvious for the past six months (Gen. Hoar: “I believe we are absolutely on the brink of failure. We are looking into the abyss.”) then the only value a lowly blogger like myself can add to the debate now is to try to peer a little further down the road, to see if I can guess what blindingly obvious facts the media will be wallowing in this time next year. And what I see coming is failure – the most spectacular U.S. foreign policy failure since the last helicopter lifted the last marine off the roof of the American embassy in Saigon.

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The story of Chalabi is a story of self-deception. Iraqis and Americans are dying because of a con man and his American dupes. Here is the whole sordid story...

THE MANIPULATOR
Ahmad Chalabi pushed a tainted case for war. Can he survive the occupation?

Congressional hearings on the C.I.A.’s failures in Iraq were held in 1998, and Chalabi’s think-tank allies, such as Richard Perle, gave testimony that excoriated the Clinton Administration. Meanwhile, Chalabi continued to gather intelligence from Iraq that would further his cause. He found an opportunity in the U.N.’s weapons-inspection program, which had been set up in 1991 to prevent Saddam from developing weapons of mass destruction. On January 27, 1998, Chalabi met in London with Scott Ritter, who was then working as a liaison for the U.N. program. At the time, the U.N. had been unable to account for a number of weapons—including nearly nine thousand litres of anthrax—that Saddam’s regime said it had dismantled. U.N. inspectors had exhausted other sources of intelligence. Chalabi claimed to have operatives who had penetrated Saddam’s circle, and offered to help. The meeting took place in Chalabi’s apartment, on Conduit Street in Mayfair. Half a dozen Arab servants served tea, Ritter recalled. Chalabi sat on a couch, taking notes, “playing the overlord.” (Ahmed Alawi, an I.N.C. official, also attended the meeting.) “I should have asked him what he could give me,” Ritter said. “Instead, I let him ask me, ‘What do you need?’” The result, he said, was that “we made the biggest mistake in the intelligence business: we identified all of our gaps.” Over the next several hours, Ritter said, he outlined most of the U.N. inspectors’ capabilities and theories, telling Chalabi how they had searched for underground bunkers with ground-penetrating radar. He also told Chalabi of his suspicion that Saddam may have had mobile chemical- or biological-weapons laboratories, which would explain why investigators hadn’t been able to find them. “We made that up!” Ritter said. “We told Chalabi, and, lo and behold, he’s fabricated a source for the mobile labs.” (The I.N.C. has been accused of sponsoring a source who claimed knowledge of mobile labs.) When Ritter left the U.N., in August, 1998, there was still no evidence of mobile weapons laboratories. Chalabi’s people, Ritter said, eventually supplied detailed intelligence on Saddam’s alleged W.M.D. programs, but “it was all crap.”

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  thanks to War and Piece

On June 30 we hand over "sovereignty" to Iraq. Who in Iraq has been the mystery. Now we think we know who, but it's still a mystery. The only thing that is not a mystery is that it appears that Chalabi's fingers are everywhere.

Talking Points Memo

I continue to think that something very important happened in this selection of Iyad Allawi. Precisely what, though, remains unclear. After all the twists and turns over the last 24 hours it seems to have been something very close to what I suggested early yesterday afternoon, a coup de main by the IGC. Or, more specifically, a coup de main launched by Allawi himself and either helped along, or facilitated or encouraged by the other members of the IGC. Now, if the IGC were either a representative or popular body -- in other words, if it were perceived as legitimate -- that would probably be a good thing. It would be good to have them take the lead. For any sort of transition to be successful in any way, the people who become the new Iraqi government cannot simply be handed power in their own country. They must take it, assert it, probably even in some degree over and against us. If nothing else this is just a matter of national dignity, which is a key part of what we're dealing with here. The problem is that the IGC isn't perceived as a legitimate body at all. Nor do the folks on it -- particuarly the ones most identified with us, like Chalabi and Allawi and others -- have any large followings. So who is taking over here? And is their assertion a product of our disarray?

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ZIPLESS COUP:

There could be no better introduction to the premiership of Iyad Allawi than the confusion and intrigue surrounding its announcement. Early yesterday, the Governing Council declared it was unanimously backing Allawi, one of its own, for the post of interim Iraqi prime minister. Not that the Council is charged with that decision; that brief lies with U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, who hadn't yet announced any replacement for Hussain Shahristani, a Brahimi-favored candidate whom Shia Council members rejected. According to The Washington Post, right after the Council resolved to back Allawi, L. Paul Bremer burst in the room to offer U.S. support. The missing piece was the United Nations, which was completely outmaneuvered by the U.S.-Governing Council announcement. Fred Eckhard, a spokesman for Kofi Annan, acknowledged that Allawi was "high on [Brahimi's] list," but indicated that Brahimi was not happy with the push to install him. While Eckhard told reporters that Brahimi "respects" the Council's choice, he pointedly added that "respect" was a "carefully chosen word." Nevertheless, the U.N. essentially conceded the move, and pledged to work with the new prime minister-designate in forming an interim government.

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Iraqi National Discord

I'm tempted to call this appointment a complete disaster, since it clearly dooms the interim government (which was probably the last, best chance to get a UN-guided political process on track) and also may undermine the one leader - Sistani - who can prevent Shi'a Iraq from splintering into warring factions. But I think we've learned from past experience that when it comes to the Bush administration and Iraq, no disaster is complete - there's always more to come. And I suspect over the next few weeks we'll find out what that "more" is.

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Meanwhile, the US seems to be retreating once again.

U.S. Retreats After Failing to Capture Militia Chief

United States forces agreed yesterday to withdraw from the Shia holy city of Najaf and end fighting with the militia of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. In a climb-down by the Americans, who had vowed to kill or capture Sadr, it now appears he will be allowed to remain free. His Army of Mehdi militia will also withdraw under the deal. The Americans appeared to have given up their two main demands to end the fighting in Najaf: that Sadr surrender to them and that the Mehdi Army be disbanded immediately. The American agreement to withdraw without capturing Sadr will be seen in Iraq as a second embarrassing capitulation in as many months, after US forces ended their April siege of the Sunni city of Fallujah without capturing those responsible for killing and mutilating the bodies of four American contractors - the original reason for the siege in which hundreds of Iraqi civilians are believed to have died.

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And what about our "success" in Fallujah?

Resembling an Islamic mini-state, Fallujah may be a glimpse of Iraq's future

With U.S. marines gone and central government authority virtually nonexistent, Fallujah resembles an Islamic mini-state - anyone caught selling alcohol is flogged and paraded in the city. Men are encouraged to grow beards and barbers are warned against giving "western" hair cuts.

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My son-in-law will be moving from South Korea to Fallujah in August.

The Bush Orthodoxy is in Shreds
A Series of Investigations has shattered Neocon Self-belief
by Sidney Blumenthal

Washington, just weeks ago in the grip of neoconservative orthodoxy, absolute belief in Bush's inevitability and righteousness, is in the throes of being ripped apart by investigations. Things fall apart: the military, loyal and lumbering, betrayed and embittered; the general in the field, General Sanchez, disgraced and cashiered; the intelligence agencies abused and angry, their retired operatives plying their craft with the press corps, seeping dangerous truths; the press, hesitating and wobbly, investigating its own falsehoods; the neocons, publicly redoubling Defense of their hero and deceiver Chalabi, privately squabbling, anxiously awaiting the footsteps of FBI agents; Colin Powell, once the most acclaimed man in America, embarked on an endless quest to restore his reputation, damaged above all by his failure of nerve; everyone in the line of fire motioning toward the chain of command, spiraling upwards and sideways, until the finger pointing in a phalanx is directed at the hollow crown.

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