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Colonel Lang "sticks out" in Washington for his informed willingness to take on what passes for "received wisdom" regarding the Middle East. His publications include the memorable "Drinking the Koolaid" in Middle East Policy. It's still an important, sobering read. Quite far afield from Graham Allison's realist "rational choice" decision-making model, Lang attributes the disastrous decision to invade Iraq to a loss of nerve among policy makers and analysts. Instead of honorably sticking to their convictions, even if it meant "falling on their swords," career-preserving senior policy makers were more inclined to drink from a Jonestown-like vat of poisonous illusions. "Succumbing to the prevailing group-think" drawn up by the small core of neoconservative "vulcans," Lang's former intelligence colleagues "drank the koolaid" and said nothing, leaving them henceforth among the "walking dead" in Washington.
Speaking here on 9/11, Lang's comments were wide-ranging and stimulating; he didn't stick narrowly to his talk title on Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah, but he had much to suggest related to all three. I offer a few highlights here:
On Military Options against Iran:
Here Lang summarized his now widely cited National Interest article from earlier this spring. (Issue #83 - no link available). Even though Lang and co-author Larry Johnson seem to accept standard worst-case assessments of Iran's nuclear aspirations, their article makes a compelling case that there are no "realistic" military options to attack Iran, by land or air, conventional, or exotic. Air assaults, whether by Israel or the US, are a "mirage" - unlikely to succeed for long, while incurring the risks of severe retaliations by Iranian assets.
To Lang, these dangers are obvious. Yet spelling them out serves the purpose of going on record so that neoconservatives in the future cannot claim - as they did with Iraq - that the disaster could not have been foreseen. This time, we've been warned.
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